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Belgium’s Expansionist History between 
1870 and 1930: Imperialism and the 
Globalisation of Belgian Business
Jan-Frederik Abbeloos
Ghent University
AbstrAct
This chapter considers if and how the political action of imperialism and the globalisa-
tion of business influenced each other in Belgium between 1870 and 1930. In addition 
to the role that Belgian King Leopold II played in the territorial partition of Africa and 
the opening up of China, the period sees a growing amount of capital and industrial 
know-how from Belgium being invested in markets outside Europe. Before World War 
I, the globalisation of Belgian business and Belgian imperialism operated relatively in-
dependently of each other, leaving the financing of the imperial project open to other 
international investors while strong political support for the globalisation of Belgian 
business was absent in this small, neutral and open country. Only after the Belgian state 
took over Leopold’s Congo Free State in 1908 and World War I infused colonial (eco-
nomic) policy with a stronger patriotic spirit, did Belgian foreign investments start to 
concentrate on the Congo. From the 1920s on, Belgian business fully seized the oppor-
tunities that imperialism had created earlier.
Op basis van een literatuurstudie wordt in dit artikel de relatie bekeken tussen het imperi-
ale project van koning Leopold II en de globaliserende actieradius van de Belgische finan-
ciële en industriële elite tussen 1870 en 1930. Voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog ontvouwden 
beide aspecten van het Belgische expansionisme zich relatief onafhankelijk van elkaar. De 
interesse van de Belgische economische elite voor Leopolds territoriale agenda was klein 
terwijl grote dynastieke, en algemeen politieke, steun bij het plaatsen van buitenlandse in-
vesteringen moeilijk te realiseren was vanuit een klein, neutraal en open land als België. 
Het succes van zowel Leopold en de Belgische economische elite was sterk afhankelijk van 
de internationale geopolitieke situatie waarin de territoriale en economische integratie zich 
afspeelden. Die liet toe dat Leopold Congo Vrijstaat verwierf en de Belgische ondernemers 
konden opereren in China, Rusland, het Midden-Oosten en Zuid-Amerika. Eens de geo-
politieke of lokale situatie zich keerde, zoals na de Bokseropstand in China of de Russische 
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Revolutie van 1917, had België niet genoeg informeel imperiale macht om deze buiten-
landse investeringen te beschermen. De economische elite steunde pas sterk op het Belgische 
formeel imperiale kader nadat de Belgische Staat Leopolds Congo had overgenomen in 
1908 en de mondiale ontwrichting van Wereldoorlog I voorbij was. Vooral tijdens de jaren 
twintig concentreren de buitenlandse investeringen vanuit België zich binnen Congo en 
regionaliseert de globalisering van Belgische investeringen binnen een koloniaal netwerk.
GlobAlisAtion, imperiAlism And economic inteGrAtion: three concepts, 
one reAlity?1
Interest among social scientists in the phenomenon of globalisation, defined broadly 
as the widening, deepening and speeding up of world-wide interconnectedness, has led 
to a renewed interest in the historical functions of capitalism and imperialism as driv-
ing forces behind this process2. The hegemonic struggle among European states and 
their military expansion from the late 15th century on gradually entangled the world 
in global networks of power, culminating at the end of the 19th century in what Eric 
Hobsbawm has called the Age of Empire3. From about 1870 on, an enormous differ-
ential opened up between the power of “The West and the Rest” and by 1900, the 
industrial core-states partitioned most of the earth among themselves4. In this process 
of New Imperialism, European states played an important role, as the “Scramble for 
Africa” and the consolidation of European power in Asia and the Middle East show.
The Age of Empire was also the era of the Gold Standard (1870-1914), which saw a 
Great Depression (1874-1895), followed by a so-called Belle Époque (1895-1913). In 
sum it was a period during which a wave of international economic integration was 
noticed, characterized by heightened international trade, increased foreign direct in-
vestment, mass migration and the integration of goods and factor markets. For several 
primary commodities and basic manufactured goods, Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Wil-
liamson show there was an international price convergence from 1870 on which is a 
strong indicator of this economic integration5. The question then arises how territorial 
integration through imperialism and economic integration related to each other and to 
the process of widening, deepening and accelerating world-wide interconnectedness.
We can look at the relationship in two ways. First, imperialism can be interpreted as a 
scaling-up of trading and investment opportunities, opening markets that had other-
wise perhaps remained closed to outside economic activity. The purpose of imperialism 
is not to connect these new markets to a global goods and factor market but to incor-
porate them into different, self-contained imperial economic networks, connecting the 
metropolis with its periphery6. According to David Held et al., during and following 
the Age of Empire, movements of capital and goods in general followed existing prefer-
ence systems of empires and their spheres of influence7. Imperial ties could make up for 
the lack of an institutionalized international trading regime and bring down transac-
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tion costs. In short, the process of territorial integration at the end of the 19th century 
made a specific contribution to economic integration, modelling the spatial lines along 
which economic activity could take place and creating specific patterns of economic 
and technological interdependency, commanded at that time by the early industrial-
ized States.
Second, any treatment of the connection between “imperialism” and “economic inte-
gration” should take into account the transnational nature of mobile capital. We could 
restate the previous paragraph and emphasize that the movements of capital and goods 
were in fact never fully determined by the existing preference systems of empires and 
their spheres of influence. The same technological evolutions in communications, trans-
port and military power that allowed for the acquisition and effective control of outside 
regions also had broader implications, reducing overall transaction costs and creating 
the framework for world-wide interconnectedness. And within an imperial network, 
the cosmopolitan origin of capital sometimes raises doubts about the nationality of 
the companies that did follow the imperial preference systems8. In short, neither the 
networks of business ownership and control nor the networks of trade and investment 
necessarily fully coincide with any imperial network.
This of course calls for further historical, empirical research, investigating to what ex-
tent the movements of capital and goods were in fact concentrated within an imperial 
network, whether this concentration changes over time and what explains it.
belGium’s expAnsionist history
This chapter tries to add to the research agenda by analysing how the political action of 
imperialism and the globalisation of business related to each other in Belgium between 
1870 and 1930. A direct comparison with other national cases is not attempted and the 
narrative will be organised around a classic national focus. This chapter however hopes 
to introduce a national case of expansionism that might be less familiar and could com-
plement the historiography of imperialism that is characterized by a predominant in-
terest in the history of the British Empire9. This historiography has provided many of 
our central insights on the link between imperialism and economic integration, such 
as Hobson’s “underconsumption theory” (1902), Fay’s 1934 launching of the concept 
of “informal imperialism”, Gallagher and Robinson’s belief that Britain controlled this 
informal empire because of its “imperialism of free trade” (1953), and Cain and Hop-
kins’ much referred to concept of “gentlemanly capitalism”, or how not just industry 
and commerce stimulated economic and territorial integration under British auspices, 
but also the interests of the landed gentry and City financiers10. This is not the place to 
review the complex debate on British Empire and the different critiques that have been 
voiced against the propositions made by Hobson, Gallagher and Robinson or Cain and 
Hopkins11. But the international resonance of the debate shows that in order to detect 
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a European or even general pattern in the relationships between territorial and eco-
nomic integration and between political and commercial/financial/industrial action, 
we need to compare the British case with expansionist histories of industrialized states 
that emerged later on the imperial scene (such as Germany and Belgium) and had lesser 
ability to turn to the use of paramount power in order to manage an informal or formal 
empire12. Great Britain could probably be the exception to the rule here, having gained 
hegemonic status during the 19th century, controlling the bulk of world trade, possess-
ing huge naval power and promoting free trade for the manufactures of the workshop 
of the world.
Belgium could hardly contrast more with this description of the British Empire. Few 
Belgian or international researchers would point to the existence of a ‘Belgian empire’, 
actually consisting of only one true overseas colonial possession (Congo 1885-1960), 
and next to this a mandate area (Ruanda-Urundi 1916-1962), a concession zone of a 
couple of square kilometres in Chinese Tientsin (1902-1929), and the Lado enclave in 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, leased to the Congo Free State between 1894 and 1906. 
Even when the existence of a Belgian empire in this context is recognized, it is consid-
ered to be “tiny”, in the words of Michael Mann, or “never much more than a joke”, in 
the words of George Schöpflin13. Nevertheless, Belgian expansionist history is an inter-
esting case for studying the relationship between the expansion of economic activity 
and territorial integration since the two processes were clearly present. In addition to 
the territorial acquisitions Leopold II made outside Europe, a growing amount of Bel-
gian capital was invested in countries inside and outside Europe by the end of the 19th 
century. Several aspects of both sides of Belgium’s expansionist history have been high-
lighted by scholars14. The task at hand here is to consider how these two expansionist 
movements can be seen as particular expressions of Belgium’s economic development 
and whether political and commercial/industrial/financial action backed each other 
up. This study presents a literature survey of Belgian expansionist history that, though 
not exhaustive, should allow us to draw some conclusions with regard to the links be-
tween territorial and economic integration, conclusions that hopefully can serve as hy-
potheses for further research.
the expAnsionist erA of An industriAlised free trAder
At the time of independence in 1830, the process of industrialisation in Belgium was 
already well underway, characterized by important technological changes in the cotton, 
wool and metallurgical sectors15. Separation from the United Kingdom of the Nether-
lands triggered an economic depression, and the loss of the Dutch market and its mari-
time and colonial merchant empire in South East Asia created problems at the demand 
side16. In order to unlock the internal market and promote transit, the Belgian state in-
vested heavily in the creation of a railroad network from 1834 on. This infrastructural 
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boom connected the Belgian economy with neighbouring markets such as Germany 
and France and it created important orders for Belgium’s coalmines and iron sector, 
pushing industrialisation further. The coal and metallurgical industries in the southern, 
Walloon region became the engines of Belgium’s industrial revolution, attracting capi-
tal from Brussels-based banks such as Société Générale de Belgique and Banque de Brux-
elles. In particular, the mixed bank Société Générale was a driving force for Belgium’s 
economic development as it was actively engaged in the internal remodelling of the in-
frastructural network and promotion of heavy industry, in the external penetration of 
Belgian investments in foreign markets and in the organisation of the Belgian colony as 
a part of an imperial economic network. According to Belgian historian Herman Van 
der Wee, the growth of a financial sector in Brussels which managed to integrate itself 
successfully into the expansion of the heavy Walloon industries provided the Belgian 
Industrial Revolution with a specific driving force whose influence would, as we shall 
see, eventually spread far beyond the borders17.
It is important to note that from the 1850s on, the process of industrialisation was 
accompanied by a free trade regime. Inspired by the repeal of the Corn Laws in Great 
Britain and operating in a context of budgetary problems, both liberal and catholic 
politicians embraced the idea of free trade and less state interventionism18. The laissez-
faire theory was never put into full political practice, but with regard to the promotion 
of exports, trade barriers were brought down between 1857 and 187019. Belgium’s tech-
nological leadership in woollen and iron industries allowed the State to remain one of 
the less protected European economies throughout the rest of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries20. Only in 1924 did Belgium issue a rather moderate import quota before it 
turned to significant protection in the 1930s21.
This export-orientated economy came under pressure during the international econom-
ic depression between 1874 and 1895 when cheap American and Russian grain flooded 
Europe. During this period, European States were putting up agricultural trade barriers, 
often followed by industrial protection22. For Belgium, the return to protectionism in 
states such as Germany (1879) and France (1881) could close off important foreign 
markets for coal, iron, fibres and machinery, the main exports from 1850 on. Eventually 
the international depression did not trigger a serious Belgian export crisis, nor did it 
cause a turn to protectionism or stimulate a significant conversion towards the chemi-
cal and electricity industries of the Second Industrial Revolution23. Compared to the 
evolution of industry in Germany, Belgium remained a country of coal, iron, metal, and 
machine construction industries24. These sectors did face a depression in the sense that 
profit margins were growing smaller as the home market for the products of these in-
dustries became saturated, a situation of overproduction/underconsumption that was 
also visible in other early European industrialising countries25.
The Belgian profit crisis of the depression was accompanied by two distinct expansion-
ist movements. First, the accumulated expertise in the industries of the First Indus-
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trial Revolution allowed Belgian capital and know-how to penetrate foreign growth 
markets of industrialising countries, expecting higher sales and larger profits. As such, 
Belgium’s free trade regime and the search for new commercial outlets were comple-
mented by an industrial policy of foreign direct investments within and outside Eu-
rope. The internationalisation of Belgian business started in the 1880s and the South 
American connection was already visible before that time. But as we can see in Table 1, 
the globalisation of Belgian business gathered momentum during the end of the depres-
sion after 1890, when Belgian public limited liability corporations started to penetrate 
distant markets such as Russia, South America, Africa, China and the Middle East, 
where they participated in infrastructural and other construction works. According 
to Wim Peeters, who compiled data on foreign direct investments from Belgium, the 
period 1890-1910 marks the zenith of L’Expansion belge26. Next to this globalisation of 
Belgian business, the imperial ambitions of King Leopold II resulted in the creation of 
the Central African country Congo as a “Free State” in 1885 and as a “Belgian colony” 
in 1908. Leopold chased his imperial dreams long before the economic depression set 
in and the acquisition of Congo cannot therefore be seen as a reaction to the economic 
depression. Still, the acquisition was realized during the depression and the purpose 
of this chapter is to see how the actions of Leopold related to the rise in foreign direct 
investment from Belgian capital. With respect to this, Table 1 gives us an indication of 
a changing relationship between the two processes by showing the geographical pat-
tern of foreign investments between 1879 and 1939. They tend to flock together into 
Congo only after the zenith of L’Expansion belge and following the turmoil of World 
War I. Our period ends when total foreign investments fall sharply after the world-wide 
Table 1:
Capital account outflow through Belgian FDI, 1879-1939 (million Belgian Francs, current yearly averages) From: W. 
Peeters, Foreign direct investment within a reconstructed balance of payments, preliminary results for Belgium, 1879-1939, 
in C.E. Núñez (ed.), Public debt, public finance, money and balance of payments in debtor countries, 1890-1932/1933, 
Sevilla, 1998, p. 119.
1879-1890 1891-1900 1901-1910 1911-1913 1914-1920 1921-1930 1931-1939
Europe 12,8 36,4 35,7 31,7 35,2 298,1 265
Russia 3,2 60,9 6,6 27,2 15,3
Congo 1,4 11,9 13,3 -12,6 72,5 786,8 588
Africa (rest) 0,1 1,5 -0,3 0,1 -0,1 6,8 -36
North America 1,4 0,5 5,9 8,6 0,6 2,8 -10
South America 7,3 12,3 29,5 37,8 18,4 151,7 -100
Far East 0,6 7,2 6,4 12,2 53,3 -27
Middle East 0,4 5,1 21,5 10,6 -1,3 59,1 49
Oceania 0,2 -0,1 -0,1
TOTAL 26,7 129,6 119,4 109,8 152,6 1358,8 708
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crisis of 1929. By then most regions show a net disinvestment while practically all for-
eign investments were made in Europe and Belgian Congo.
foreiGn direct investment of cApitAl
The export of Belgian capital was promoted by a network of mixed banks such as the 
aforementioned Société Générale or specialised holding companies that were set up by 
bankers or businessmen such as Edouard Empain or Edouard Otlet (both active in 
Latin America) or the Cockerill group, which played a pioneering role in Russia. They 
gathered the necessary capital and constituted networks of agents prospecting for in-
vestment opportunities27. Within a group of imitators or public limited companies that 
were sometimes set up for speculative reasons, these big investors and their “economic 
empires” have received the most, yet relatively limited, attention among historians28. 
For the purpose of this study, assessing the relationship between territorial and eco-
nomic integration, the operations of the Société Générale are very instructive.
Reflecting the broader Belgian pattern of foreign investments, Société Générale only 
made a few investments outside Belgium before 1870 (contributing to the industrialisa-
tion of northern Spain, Germany and France). And before 1890 it rarely looked outside 
Europe29. Under the leadership of governor Ferdinand Baeyens (1892-1913) and direc-
tor Jean Jadot (1906-1912) it would become more actively engaged in the international 
expansion of capital. Overproduction threatened heavy industry and Société Générale 
looked for new commercial outlets and investments abroad. Attention turned to Russia 
after 1895 where Société Générale was involved in the production of steel and coal min-
ing. Fast developing heavy industry provided the technological expertise to be utilised 
abroad, the framework of the mixed bank provided the necessary capital, information, 
coordination and control of these investments30. The foreign activities of Société Géné-
rale thus followed the wave of internationalisation engaged in by other groups, but it 
gained an extra dimension because of its links with the political power and the dynastic 
tradition of Belgium. The management of Société Générale co-opted members who had 
exercised important political functions, while the Royal Family had a representative on 
the board of commissioners31. These ties eventually extended the sphere of action of 
Société Générale to distant markets such as China and Congo.
Let us take a closer look at the Chinese case. Around 1895, Belgian penetration of the 
Chinese empire was virtually nonexistent, despite the efforts of King Leopold II and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote commercial relations and despite the pres-
ence of the Cockerill group in China. At that point, King Leopold II, who lobbied 
via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pushed Ferdinand Baeyens and Société Générale 
to participate in the construction of a railroad between Hankow and Beijing, which 
started in 1898 and was completed in 1905. The concession for this railroad was given 
to Belgium because of the neutral status of the country and the good reputation Belgian 
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business enjoyed, thanks to the earlier involvement of the Cockerill group in China. 
Leopold saw economic penetration as a potential steppingstone for further economic 
penetration of and territorial gains in a Chinese Empire that was weakened after the 
Japanese-Sino war of 1894-1895. Société Générale was sceptical about the project at first 
but was persuaded to invest because of the potential benefits the project would have for 
Belgian industry and because it could invest together with French bank Paribas (this ar-
rangement allowed French capital to invest behind the façade of Belgian neutrality)32. 
The king pressured Société Générale to ensure it would outweigh French involvement in 
the newly founded Société d’Etudes de Chemins de Fer en Chine. This succeeded, thanks 
to the efficient leadership of the project on the part of Belgian engineer Jean Jadot, and 
Société Générale managed to capitalize on the railway construction by opening Banque 
Sino Belge in 1902. Leopold supported these operations but his stepping stone theory 
proved incorrect, as Belgium did not gain territory in China, apart from a concession-
ary zone of a couple of square kilometres in Chinese Tientsin (1902-1929). A growing 
sense of nationalism within the Chinese government after the Boxer Rebellion made 
further territorial expansion impossible. The imperial agenda of Leopold was also at-
tacked by Jean Jadot because it could provoke Chinese distrust. Why did Belgium want 
to act as a major European power, Jadot asked himself, when the international promo-
tion of its industry prospered in spite of its not being a great power?33
Jadot points here to an important characteristic of Belgian expansionism: it was not 
backed up by a strong state with imperial ambitions. Nine years after its independence, 
the European powers had imposed a regime of permanent neutrality on Belgium with-
out strong guarantees on how to respect this neutrality34. Nevertheless, Belgian public 
and official opinion came to accept neutrality as Belgium’s normal international condi-
tion and no Belgian leader or political party put the regime into question before World 
War I (ut infra)35. As we have seen, this political regime of neutrality met with an eco-
nomic free trade regime by the 1850s. Within this context, all round political support 
for the globalisation of business was rather low, apart from the support by some pas-
sionate advocates such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul de Faverau (1896-1907) 
or certain diplomats36. The official chambers of commerce were dissolved in 1875 and 
since then (newly established) private chambers of commerce and societies could only 
promote Belgian industry and commerce by lobbying the government and by partici-
pating in a series of world fairs that took place in Belgium between 1885 and 193037. 
This however does not seem to have hindered the globalisation of Belgian business. On 
the contrary, as researchers René Brion and Jean-Louis Moreau suggest, Belgium’s lack 
of an imperial tradition, lack of significant military power, its neutrality and its low 
State support for commerce may have helped to create just the right opportunities to 
invest abroad. Simply put, next to the technological know-how it had to offer, Belgium 
might have looked harmless to other States, leading to trust in Belgian companies38. 
The argument is valid with regard to the Chinese story and it also facilitated invest-
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ments in South America39. As the case of the French bank Paribas shows, the Belgian 
character of these investments should be interpreted loosely in this context. Whereas 
foreign capital could register in London to receive some protection rent from the Em-
pire, foreign capital could ‘settle’ in Brussels to invest behind the façade of neutral-
ity. However, Belgium’s neutrality never provided any exclusive investment privileges. 
None of the countries it invested in proved resistant to the penetration by traditional 
imperialists such as Great Britain and France. At best Belgium’s “tiny character” served 
as a negotiating asset when making a foreign investment deal. And it was not a perma-
nent advantage. Belgian neutrality certainly did not make ‘Belgian’ investors immune 
from accusations of imperialism. In Russia, they were confronted with increasing hos-
tility once the country faced a political and economic crisis at the turn of the century.
The neutrality of the Belgian state proved of little value in a context of rising nation-
alism and distrust towards foreign involvement, a sentiment that intensified after the 
Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905). The investment climate deteriorated and eventually 
the Russian Revolution of 1917 made any foreign investment impossible40. A similar 
development is noted in China after the Boxer Rebellion, but here foreign economic 
involvement was not made impossible as such although only the big investment groups 
managed to keep up their economic activities in China. In conclusion Belgium had 
little power to enforce investments in foreign markets or safeguard them once the 
political climate deteriorated. The cause of the globalisation of Belgian business was 
endogenous to the economic development of Belgium within a context of falling in-
ternational prices, but the opportunities that businessmen had to export the available 
capital and know-how were determined by geopolitical currents over which the Belgian 
state had little influence. Moreover, the search for these opportunities was to a large 
extent left to the businessmen themselves and was promoted by King Leopold II who 
also tried to exploit geopolitical opportunities for his own imperial agenda. The biggest 
promotion for Belgian interests and business that Leopold could think of was the crea-
tion of a formal Belgian empire, to which we turn now.
the foreiGn direct rule of leopold ii
After numerous failed attempts to acquire an overseas possession of any sort, Leopold 
II took the right gamble when he hired Henry Morton Stanley to explore the region 
around the African Congo-river between 1880 and 1884. He finally gained the rec-
ognition of the “Congo Free State” by the other European powers in 1885. Leopold’s 
imperial agenda coupled personal and dynastic pursuit of honour and glory with the 
desire, or at least the claim, to make Belgium a great and wealthy nation. In line with the 
colonial aspirations of his father King Leopold I, Prince Leopold II had already talked 
to the Belgian Senate in 1855 about the need for commercial expansion, searching for 
new and protected markets for Belgian products41. After he became king in 1865, he 
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intensified his efforts to put his ideals into practice. One way of realizing his views was 
through colonisation, a form of expansion which would not only create commercial 
opportunities but could also provide “spoils of efficient exploitation” as a direct way of 
organising an economic transfer from the colony to the royal family and Belgium42.
Industrial and financial groups showed a lack of enthusiasm for Leopold’s colonising 
plans43. Belgian industrialists might have been encouraged in their efforts to penetrate 
foreign markets by the acquisition of Belgian Congo by King Leopold II in 1885, but 
the colonial project itself had few supporters44. The real push for foreign direct invest-
ment was yet to come in 1885 and the export of goods, capital and know-how was still 
predominantly European orientated. When the real worldwide export of capital came, 
Belgian investors were more interested in the industrialising areas of the capitalist pe-
riphery than in looking for protected, distant and unlocked colonial markets in Af-
rica45. Political support for Leopold’s plans also was low because it conflicted with the 
free trade doctrine that was popular among politicians from 1860 on and because an 
imperial project could endanger the neutrality of Belgium46. Up to the creation of the 
Congo Free State in 1885, Leopold chased his colonial dream without any considerable 
support from the Belgian state or Belgian capital. He did, however, succeed because of 
the renewed interest among European powers in colonisation, a mentality that Leopold 
took advantage of to draw his own colony on the African map and get it recognised. 
The other European powers agreed on Leopold’s project because Congo was construct-
ed as a zone of free trade and free business in Africa. Supervised by Leopold, Congo 
became a “Free State”. In 1885 the Belgian parliament endorsed the view that only a 
personal union existed between Congo and Belgium, which meant that the colony was 
Leopold’s private affair both politically and financially. Congo Free State was a “colony 
without a metropolis”47.
Leopold himself would always see his private colony as an important economic asset 
for Belgium. He promoted Belgian investments in the region through his personal con-
nections with the Antwerp and Brussels industrial and financial elites. The creation 
of an armed Force Publique guaranteed a minimum of territorial consolidation and 
stability. But given the risky nature of investing in Congo and the high opportunity 
cost, the Free State did not become an important investment opportunity, let alone a 
commercial outlet, for the Belgian business elite. In 1885, Société Générale for example 
did participate in a loan to construct a railroad in Congo but basically it remained 
uninterested in the economic potential of Congo. When for this reason a new invest-
ment trust was set up in 1886, Le Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l’Industrie 
(CCCI), its promoter Albert Thys had the greatest difficulty in bringing the neces-
sary capital together48. To counter the lack of Belgian investments, Leopold invested 
part of his personal fortune in Congo, acquired loans from the Belgian government 
(in 1887, 1900 and 1905) and relied on the mobilisation of the cosmopolitan finan-
cial and trading networks for his capital needs49. But the financial problems remained 
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and Leopold abandoned the liberal character of the Free State’s economy altogether in 
1891-1892. Import duties were levied in consultation with the other scrambling pow-
ers and Leopold remodelled almost the entire economy of Congo into a huge State 
monopoly. By 1892, free trade and free business were given up and a system of “con-
cessionary capitalism” emerged. Investors received royal land grants, the right to po-
lice, enforce labour participation and exploit Congo’s natural assets. In return the Free 
State received several shares in the licensed companies. Under this new regime, spoils 
were indeed realized as rubber and ivory were collected brutally and shipped out to 
the port of Antwerp. At that point, the Brussels capital network around Société Géné-
rale still kept its distance but Antwerp bankers, such as Alexandre de Browne de Tiège 
and traders such as Eduoard Bunge became involved in the exploitation of and trade 
in these precious natural assets50. Meanwhile an imperial spirit grew within certain, 
albeit still small, Belgian networks that supported colonial acquisition51. But as some 
private holding companies obtained no concession, such as Société Belge du Commerce 
du Haut-Congo, and were sidelined in Congo, a general feeling of trust among Belgian 
capitalists in the Congolese adventure was still missing. So, in conclusion, some ven-
ture capitalists with personal connections to Leopold seized their moment in Congo, 
but the leading expansionist industrial sectors from Belgium had less opportunity and 
no incentive to do business in Central Africa. Nevertheless, the profitable turn in the 
colonial economy strengthened Leopold’s belief in the benefits of territorial expansion, 
something he consequently aimed for in China as we have seen and attempted in Bra-
zil52. In both cases the imperial project failed. Nevertheless, the Chinese experience was 
important since it had brought Leopold and Société Générale closer together.
After the Chinese experience Société Générale responded to Leopold’s calls to invest in 
Congo, this time in a significant manner. Under the auspices of Jean Jadot, who had 
left China and became director of Société Générale in 1906, three licensed companies 
were set up by Leopold in that year to further exploit Congo’s mineral resources: the 
Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), Société Internationale Forestière et Minière 
du Congo (Forminière) and La Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga 
(BCK). Because of their managerial and technological expertise, Leopold promoted 
British and American involvement in the companies. In order to have a Belgian voice 
on the board, he sought the support of Société Générale as he had done earlier in China. 
But even though 1906 signalled the beginning of the involvement of Société Générale 
in Congo, a significant influx of Belgian capital into Congo did not take place until the 
1920s, after Congo had been taken over by the Belgian state and World War I infused 
economic (colonial) policy with a stronger patriotic spirit.
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belGiAn conGo: the creAtion of An imperiAl economic network
Congo Free State became Belgian Congo in 1908, when the Belgian state took over 
Leopold’s “enterprise” in reaction to the international criticisms of the concession sys-
tem that Leopold II had installed from 1890 in what should have been a Free State. 
The concession system directly infringed the provisions of the Berlin Act of 1885 on 
the freedom of trade in the Congo basin. As the system pushed the collection of wild 
rubber by all available means, it furthermore resulted in the brutal treatment of the 
Africans. This also conflicted with the Act which urged the powers exercising author-
ity in the Congo basin to protect and further the welfare of the inhabitants53 This was 
the central message of the Congo Reform Association (and especially the trio of Roger 
Casement, Edmund Morel, and John Holt), which was able to exert continuous pres-
sure upon the British government and the Foreign Office, providing an important im-
petus to the change of ownership of Congo from Leopold to the Belgian government 
in 190854. One year later, Leopold died and Albert I became the new king of Belgium, 
one with fewer ties to but a profound interest in the development of Belgian Congo.
After the Belgian take-over, Congo gradually reflected the colonial satellite pattern of 
production, serving primarily as a source of raw materials for the metropolis while im-
porting most of the manufactured goods required. From a Belgian perspective however, 
Congo did not become an important economic partner for Belgium. Overall, only 2.7 
per cent of Belgian exports went in the direction of Central Africa and only 5.7 per 
cent of all imports came from the colony. The total impact of the Congo on the Belgian 
economy was also limited and never exceeded 3 per cent of the Belgian GDP55. But this 
macro-economic picture might be misleading. If Congo was of little significance for 
the growth rate of the total Belgian economy, colonial opportunities probably contrib-
uted to the development and growth of specific sectors in the Belgian economy. Under 
Leopold, the trade in colonial resources to some extent stimulated the development of 
the port of Antwerp, and under the Belgian regime, the availability of Katangese raw 
copper allowed for the refining of copper in Belgium and development of a non-fer-
rous industry56. Next to this, Congo became a financial blessing for a relatively small 
network of Belgian investors due to the highly profitable investments in the region. By 
1920, revenues from financial and industrial investment largely exceeded profits from 
metropolitan industries57. The 1920s can be seen as the decade in which Belgian finan-
cial and industrial interests were finally attracted to Congo, fusing the expansionist 
agenda of capital with the imperial opportunity of having a colony. What accounts for 
this shift?
On the one hand the 1920s saw a growing demand for foreign commodities and raw 
materials that rekindled the economic elite’s international outlook. On the other hand 
European inter-State relations had changed during and after World War I. Great Britain 
had suffered a first blow to its hegemonic position and all warring States had the experi-
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ence of commanding a war economy in contrast to any pre-war ideological hesitation 
to intervene strongly in the economic sphere58. Within this geopolitical situation the 
Belgian economic elite seized the opportunities that Belgian imperialism had created 
in Congo earlier. This time business did follow the flag for two complementary reasons. 
On the one hand the Russian and Chinese experiences might have raised some doubts 
about the strength of informal imperial or investor networks. On the other the formal 
imperial network that the Belgian state commanded probably seemed like a beneficial 
business environment, one that no longer rested on the ambitions of one man and was 
actually aimed at attracting big Belgian investors.
This promotion of Belgian investments in Congo was part of a patriotic colonial pol-
icy that had developed since Belgium took over Congo in 1908. Whereas Leopold’s 
project initially met with political apathy, the Belgian political elite gradually embraced 
and even emphasized the Belgian character of and mission in Congo after the take-over. 
Within the Ministry of Colonies and among leading politicians and diplomats, the at-
titude prevailed that Belgian Congo was a national affair59. Congo was however not an 
important State affair. The Belgian take-over was accompanied by a strict separation of 
the Belgian state budget and the colonial budget. Public investments in the colony were 
quite small in comparison with total government expenditure and the public invest-
ments made by other colonising nations60. Using the well-known expression coined by 
Crawford Young, the managing of Congo’s development was left to a “colonial trinity” 
composed of the colonial administration, the large enterprises and the Catholic mis-
sions, which are left out of the picture here61. Although the interests of all three partners 
in the trinity could diverge, the metaphor underscores the fact that the decision making 
process in Brussels was centred on the Ministry of Colonies whose decisions were to be 
implemented by the colonial administration and largely aimed at the promotion of the 
interests of Belgian investors and Belgian Catholic missions.
The idea that Congo was a national affair generated distrust towards too much foreign 
involvement with it, either in the form of foreign investments or settlements in the 
region or in the form of foreign critiques on how to manage the colony adequately. 
During the first two decades of Belgian Congo this attitude even gave way to a colonial 
policy of “Belgianization” which aimed to augment the percentage of Belgians in the 
total white population of Congo and to attract further Belgian capital to Congo62. This 
patriotic attitude itself was a reaction to a general fear of being sidelined in Africa by 
stronger colonising states, a fear that almost turned into suspicion with regards to Great 
Britain, which only recognised Belgian Congo in 191363. Anxieties remained after-
wards as World War I showed that both in Congo and in Europe, Belgium’s neutrality 
was not self-evident when it conflicted with the interests of stronger states. Germany 
invaded Belgium on 4 August 1914 and the fear existed that Congo would also be 
incorporated into Germany’s African imperial project. In practice the German Foreign 
Office placed a low priority on expansion in Central Africa, although officials at the 
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Colonial Ministry went to considerable lengths to promote German economic inter-
ests in the Congo64. But these officials knew that there was little hope of maintaining an 
economic interest in Congo when war broke out in Africa. It was actually Great Britain 
and France that resisted the stipulation in the Berlin Agreement for the neutralization 
of the Congo basin in the event of a war between European colonial powers. Belgium 
complied and permitted the transit of Allied forces through the colony. This allowed 
for the first attack against German possessions in Central Africa on 5 August 1914, 
before Germany fired the first shots in Congo on 22 August65. In the words of Bruce 
Fetter, 1914 proved to the Belgian elite that political leaders were “capable of sacrificing 
cherished principles of government to nationalist sentiment”66.
World War I had thus “fatally undermined” the regime of permanent neutrality and 
stimulated a greater interest in safeguarding national security, both political and eco-
nomic67. In general, this was a preoccupation that all the belligerent parties shared and 
after World War I a greater sense of economic nationalism prevailed within Europe. Es-
pecially when it came to the supply of raw materials, Germany and Britain, but also jun-
ior partners like Belgium, wanted to secure their own supply within their own sphere of 
influence. In the case of the copper sector for example, this agenda was pursued through 
the actions of State-sponsored corporations such as the British Metal Corporation, Met-
allgesellschaft and the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga68. I mention the copper sec-
tor because it became the backbone of Congo’s export-orientated economy while the 
Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, the company whose creation initially pulled Société 
Générale into Congo, developed into the biggest Belgian colonial company. After 
World War I Jean Jadot and Société Générale shared the political concern for economic 
security and the need to reboot Belgian economic performance. This connected well to 
their own need to set up a metallurgical industry in Belgium that would literally bring 
home the financial and industrial benefits of Congo’s copper treatment69.
Within Congo the fusion between a patriotic economic policy and business interests 
resulted during the investment boom of the 1920s in the formation of what Jean-Luc 
Vellut has called a “colonial bloc”, a conjunction between political and private interests, 
visible in the close co-operation in Brussels and in the local operations of the colonial 
administration. Business relied on politics to partition the territory into economic and 
social areas, giving preference to the priorities of various sectors of the colonial econo-
my such as mining, agriculture and the transport sector. Politics depended on colonial 
business for its tax revenue and pushed it to contribute to the development of the me-
tropolis and the colony. The relationship between these two members of the colonial 
trinity was however unequal. The balance in Congo was in favour of the large companies 
that made the largest contribution to the colonial budget and had the best connections 
within a network of power that brought businessmen and politicians together in Brus-
sels70. As the ministers of colonies were almost all members of the Catholic party and 
the managers of Société Générale originated from a Catholic social environment, the op-
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erations of the colonial bloc were already criticized by contemporary right and left wing 
politicians inside Belgium who saw Société Générale as a “State inside the State” and the 
Ministry of Colonies as a mere servant of private interests71. These accusations demand 
further historical research but in any case Société Générale greatly expanded its control 
over the Congolese economy during the twenties, despite its initial hesitation to invest 
in the colony. If one company history states that in 1921 Congo was still nothing more 
than a financial black hole (“un gouffre d’argent”), the absorption by Société Générale 
of Banque d’Outremer in 1928 signalled the beginning of what Guy Vanthemsche has 
called a colonial “economic empire”72. Due to this merger, Société Générale gained con-
trol over the CCCI of the late Albert Thys (ut supra) and it dramatically expanded its 
range of activities in Congo. This economic empire was managed by a handful of men 
of Société Générale and a colonial committee that was specially set up to manage the 
different interests of the holding company in the colony. An analysis of the network 
of these people and this committee could certainly provide some insights in the extent 
and limits of the interests between State and capital73. Today a lot of company archives, 
such as those of the CCCI and the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga are open, and 
Belgian researchers René Brion and Jean-Louis Moreau have catalogued them74. These 
archives can probably provide a better insight into relations between State and capital 
in the administration of Congo.
conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to consider whether the globalisation of Belgian business 
and the process of imperialism between 1870 and 1930 could be seen as particular ex-
pressions of Belgium’s economic development, and whether political action and com-
mercial/financial/industrial action backed each other up during this phase. Based on a 
literature survey we can conclude that initially the globalising actions of a limited net-
work of investors, bankers and holding companies such as Société Générale happened 
relatively independently from the pattern of imperial expansionism that was carried 
out by King Leopold II and a small circle of confidants. Only the former can be linked 
to Belgium’s history as an industrialized free trader. Up to 1870, Belgium benefited 
from a European free trade consensus and the Belgian economic elite had no incen-
tive to search systematically for foreign direct investment opportunities, let alone to 
participate in any colonial scheme. After 1870, when colonisation became fashionable, 
the Belgian economic elite devised its own strategy to face the challenges of overpro-
duction, profiting from the accumulated know-how in the leading sectors of the First 
Industrial Revolution and stimulated by surplus capital that was gathered within the 
industrial groups, mixed banks or on the stock exchange. Financial and industrial inter-
ests fused in the setting up of investments in foreign markets in and outside Europe.
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Whereas Belgian capital at the end of the 19th century found sufficient investment op-
portunities in the markets of new industrializing states and business saw no need for a 
search for protected markets, Leopold firmly believed that colonies would always ben-
efit the home country, even when they were located in a remote and unlocked region 
such as Central Africa. He tried to stimulate the interests of Belgian business for the re-
gions that gained his attention, such as China and Congo. But as we have seen, both in 
Congo and China the enthusiasm of the business elite remained low and Table 1 shows 
that in comparison to other regions such as Russia and South America, a relatively small 
amount of capital was invested in Congo or China. Nevertheless, without Leopold II, 
investments in the regions would be even lower or inexistent and the actions of the 
king did create opportunities of which a limited network of Belgian and other inves-
tors made use. In the longer run, Leopold’s imperial dreams led to the formation of 
Belgian Congo, a colony which did become an attractive investment region. After the 
investment climates changed in Russia and China and within a context of post-war 
protectionism, the colony was incorporated more strongly into an imperial network, 
benefiting Belgian investments.
In both globalisation and the imperial pattern of expansionism, the Belgian state acted 
as a rather invisible third party before World War I. Political support for the expansion-
ism of business and Leopold’s imperialism was limited to individuals within the politi-
cal parties, the diplomatic corps and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The institutions as 
such provided limited systematic and active support. The dominance of the free trade 
regime and Belgium’s neutrality can explain this attitude. However, the opinion was 
voiced that the invisibility of the Belgian state and its neutrality might just have created 
the right circumstances in which Belgian companies could easily penetrate distant mar-
kets such as Russia, South America and China. This image was a promotional tool for 
Belgian business which otherwise could not count on the Belgian state to enforce in-
vestments in foreign markets or safeguard them once the political climate deteriorated. 
The Belgian state did get involved in the political management of the colony from 1908 
onward. Following the turmoil of World War I, Belgium’s traditional political policy of 
neutrality and economic non-interventionism made way for a more cooperative strat-
egy between state and capital in colonial affairs. The 1920s seem to be the moment 
when Congo became incorporated into an imperial network, serving the needs of the 
metropolis and Belgian investors. Political action and commercial action backed each 
other, or more precisely political action seemed to back up commercial action.
In sum, Belgium’s expansionist history shows links between territorial and economic 
integration that change over time due to the changing geopolitical and geo-economic 
situations and the motives of the expansionist groups involved. This broad conclusion 
is based on a rather anonymous treatment of those who directed political and commer-
cial action and a strong focus on the metropolitan side of the imperial equation.
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First the anonymous treatment. Given the scope of this chapter, I presented the con-
text within which actions took place more than the actions themselves or the actors 
involved. The choice is more than a pragmatic one as the relationship between the Bel-
gian and international network of investors and Leopold II and the relationship be-
tween investors and the colonial administration or the Belgian state are in need of more 
scholarly attention. In addition to this we know too little of the mental map of the par-
ties involved. State officials, the colonial administrators, investors and the missions may 
have had different views on the short and long-term objectives of the colonial project in 
particular or expansionism in general. Finally the role and importance of foreign capital 
in the expansion of ‘Belgian’ companies and the development of Congo has only be 
touched upon but should be addressed more clearly. A thorough analysis of the origins 
and motivations of the investors that ‘passed’ through Brussels could point this out.
Next to this the local dynamics in the different regions where capital was invested 
and their feedback effects have for the most part been left out of the picture. Only the 
changing Russian and Chinese investment climate has been referred to in this contex-
tual analysis. Here the choice is for the most part pragmatic as there is a vast literature 
on the economic and social history of “host economies” such as Russia, China and of 
course colonial Congo. However, this literature is often not concerned with the link 
between local events and the reaction in Brussels, especially in the case of imperial Rus-
sia and China; the Belgian connection is of lesser importance to their history. And as 
regards Congo, it is hard to assess the ability and willingness of the colonial apparatus 
to implement metropolitan policy, or to ascertain how the relationship between colo-
nial administrations and colonial business differed between Brussels and the colony.
Exploring these two aspects would allow for a more thorough treatment of the relations 
between the expansionist tendencies of commercial/financial/industrial interests and 
political interests in Belgium’s expansionist or international history. This chapter has 
hopefully situated the problem, introduced the Belgian example of national expansion-
ism and showed why it would be important to connect it to the broader debate on the 
links between territorial expansion and economic integration.
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